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This is just an illustration of how 
information technology can help in 
quantifying subtle collective behaviours. In 
the context of economics, such experiments 
could be enormously valuable. For example, 
it has been shown11 that the volume of 
transactions of a company at a certain time is 
correlated to the volume of searches related 
to that company at the previous time-step — 
the reason is unclear, but it could be that the 
number of searches is a rough measure of the 
interest (generated by worry or enthusiasm) 
in that company. Notably, similar systems 
have been employed to predict other 
phenomena, such as flu epidemics12.
The coincidence of new theoretical tools, 
a wealth of new data and the will to change 
paradigms provides a chance for a leap 
forward in our understanding of financial 
and economic systems, with an attendant 
increase in our capacity to manage them and 
avoid the worst problems. One important 
challenge, among many others, is to make 
scientific advances both available to the 
public, and useful for policymakers. No 
one believes that better science alone will 
make economic crises a thing of the past, or 
allow the precise prediction of the economic 
or financial future. But better models that 
take into account feedbacks and network 
dynamics should greatly boost the ability of 
everyone to foresee the kinds of events to 
which markets and economies are prone, 
to understand the conditions that are likely 
to create them, and to offer some guidance 
on how to avoid those circumstances. 
Even a little more knowledge could be of 
great value. ❐
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Complex derivatives
Stefano Battiston, Guido Caldarelli, Co-Pierre Georg, Robert May and Joseph Stiglitz
The intrinsic complexity of the financial derivatives market has emerged as both an incentive to engage 
in it, and a key source of its inherent instability. Regulators now faced with the challenge of taming this 
beast may find inspiration in the budding science of complex systems.
When financial derivatives were cast1 in 2002 as latent ‘weapons of mass destruction’, one might 
have expected the world at large to sit up 
and listen — particularly in the wake of 
subsequent events that led to the financial 
crisis of 2008. Instead, the derivatives 
market continues to grow in size and 
complexity (Fig. 1), spawning a new 
generation of financial innovations, and 
raising concerns about its potential impact 
on the economy as a whole.
A derivative instrument is a financial 
contract between two parties, in which 
the value of the payoff is derived from 
the value of another financial instrument 
or asset, called the underlying entity. In 
some cases, this contract acts as a kind 
of insurance: in a credit default swap, for 
example, a lender might buy protection 
from a third party to insure against the 
default of the borrower. However, unlike 
conventional insurance, in which a person 
necessarily owns the house she wants 
to insure, derivatives can be negotiated 
on any underlying entity — meaning 
anyone could take out insurance on the 
house in question. Speculation therefore 
emerges as another reason to trade 
in derivatives.
By engaging in a speculative derivatives 
market, players can potentially amplify 
their gains, which is arguably the most 
plausible explanation for the proliferation of 
derivatives in recent years. Needless to say, 
losses are also amplified. Unlike bets on, say, 
dice — where the chances of the outcome 
are not affected by the bet itself — the 
more market players bet on the default of a 
country, the more likely the default becomes. 
Eventually the game becomes a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, as in a bank run, where if each 
party believes that others will withdraw their 
money from the bank, it pays each to do so. 
More perversely, in some cases parties have 
incentives (and opportunities) to precipitate 
these events, by spreading rumours or 
by manipulating the prices on which the 
derivatives are contingent — a situation 
seen most recently in the London Interbank 
Offered Rate (LIBOR) affair.
Proponents of derivatives have long 
argued that these instruments help to 
stabilize markets by distributing risk, 
but it has been shown recently that in 
many situations risk sharing can also lead 
to instabilities2,3.
Market as network
Players engaging in the derivatives market 
can enter into an unlimited number of 
contracts with other parties, so the market 
can be seen as a complex financial network, 
in which interactions between the nodes 
are nonlinear4. A derivative contract can 
itself be made arbitrarily complex — it has 
























Figure 1 | The largest players in the derivatives 
market. Despite a downturn following the 2008 
financial crisis, the volume of derivative contracts 
for 30 top market players continues to increase, 
with the 7 biggest labelled in colour. Data from 
Bankscope © 2013 Bureau van Dijk. 
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were presented in the older idiom of a 
‘prospectus’, it could run to something like 
109 pages. Derivatives can be constructed 
recursively, such that one derivative 
underlies another, and the payoff can depend 
on any imaginable set of events — say, the 
weather in London three months from now. 
This means that in modelling the market 
as a network, representing banks as nodes 
and contracts as links, one quickly finds that 
both nodes and links can depend on the state 
of other nodes in the network. This requires 
building an extra level of complexity into the 
network models with which physicists have 
become familiar. Describing the dynamics 
of such a system is enough of a challenge for 
network science — apart from the problems 
posed by predicting its behaviour and 
ensuring its robustness to failure.
The network is further complicated by a 
lack of transparency. A large fraction of trades 
on the derivatives network occur over-the-
counter (OTC), meaning they are privately 
negotiated between two parties without the 
need for an intermediary. Worldwide, the 
total volume of OTC derivatives increased 
steadily from US$100 trillion in 2000 to over 
US$500 trillion in 2011 — more than five 
times the global gross domestic product. 
Despite the huge volumes involved, all 
OTC contracts are confidential and are not 
disclosed, rendering the structure of the 
network largely obscure — and hindering 
our understanding of the derivatives 
market as a complex system. Indeed, these 
characteristics make the market vulnerable 
to the build-up of instabilities that suddenly, 
and unpredictably, induce cascades of the 
sort shared by many nonlinear phenomena 
in physics.
The European Commission has recently 
adopted new reporting standards that may 
improve the situation, and could be enforced 
as early as the end of 2013. Without such 
measures, this lack of transparency may 
itself contribute to an intrinsic financial 
instability, setting aside the problems 
associated with regulators having restricted 
access to information. Indeed, when market 
participants come to believe that there are 
large asymmetries of information, they may 
not trade with each other. This so-called 
no-trade theorem6 — sometimes referred 
to as a drying up of liquidity—is precisely 
what happened in 2007–2008: the interbank 
lending market dried up, and banks refused 
to lend to each other, forming a key factor in 
prompting the global financial crisis.
Paradoxically, this information 
asymmetry is one of the main incentives for 
market players to engage in a derivatives 
market that is so complex. Derivatives, 
especially OTC derivatives, are not easy to 
price, and their evaluation relies on models. 
This makes it harder to estimate the risk 
of the deal, resulting in an information 
asymmetry that can be exploited at the 
expense of other parties. In markets with 
full rationality, such contracts wouldn’t be 
executed — the party with less information 
would simply refuse to sign6. But there is 
ample evidence in the literature of both 
economics and psychology to suggest 
that individuals routinely overestimate 
their own knowledge. 
Another way that financial institutions 
profit from complexity stems from their need 
to be perceived as systemically important, to 
guarantee governmental rescue in the face 
of crisis. Systemic importance is no longer 
regarded as simply a matter of size — of 
banks being ‘too big to fail’. In complex 
networks, an initial impact can be greatly 
amplified by cascading along the network’s 
connections. A correspondence between 
cascade sizes and ‘centrality’ — quantifying 
a node’s importance in the network — has 
therefore given rise to the idea of a bank 
being ‘too central to fail’, which can be 
captured by the DebtRank indicator7. Related 
notions of ‘too connected to fail’ or ‘too 
correlated to fail’ are also now beginning to 
be factored into governmental subsidization 
of the financial sector.
But the perceived benefits of complexity 
are certainly not restricted to the network 
players that fulfil these key roles. The 
complexity of both the instruments and the 
network structure can render peripheral 
institutions virtually indistinguishable from 
the core of institutions that are guaranteed 
government subsidy — meaning that risk-
averse governments will also come to their 
rescue. If the market were more transparent, 
competition would be stronger, and profits 
would be eroded. Thus, being ‘too complex 
to fail’ may pay off well for individual banks, 
even if it undermines systemic performance.
And there remains an even less savoury 
use of complexity. Derivatives can be used 
to manipulate accounts to make things 
seem better at one moment, at the cost of 
making things look worse at another. The 
most notorious example of this is a recent 
case of financial institutions using derivatives 
to make Greece’s financial position 
appear strong enough for membership of 
the Eurozone.
Complexity and instability
Early studies of ecosystem stability 
erroneously implied that greater 
complexity — given by more species 
interacting more extensively — automatically 
conferred greater robustness. But subsequent 
investigation has shown that, in general, the 
converse is true. This is encapsulated by the 
May–Wigner theorem8, which conveys the 
fact that increasing complexity in a network 
inevitably leads to its destabilization. One 
might think of this as a formalization of the 
everyday idea that complicating matters 
tends to multiply the number of ways that 
things can go wrong.
It now seems that the proliferation 
of financial instruments induces strong 
fluctuations and instabilities for similar 
reasons4. The basis for pricing complex 
derivatives makes several conventional 
assumptions that amount to the notion 
that trading activity does not feed back on 
the dynamical behaviour of markets. This 
idealized (and unrealistic) model can have 
the effect of masking potential instabilities in 
markets. A more detailed picture, taking into 
account the effects of individual trades on 
prices, reveals the onset of singularities as the 
number of financial instruments increases4. 
The continued development of myriad new 
instruments and the steady increase in the 
number and connectivity of market players 
therefore seem to give rise to the conditions 
stipulated by the May–Wigner theorem.
The instability is not necessarily easy to 
understand from the idealized model. The 
idea is that once there are enough derivative 
instruments available to meet the demands 
of all players, the market is essentially 
complete. But as long as there is a monetary 
incentive to create new instruments, banks 
will continue to do so. Subsequent trades will 
then serve only to increase the complexity 
of the network at the expense of stability. 
The irony is that if the market were in fact 
complete, these contracts would have no real 
effect. But under the real-world conditions 
of an incomplete market characterized by 
considerable complexity, these trades, even 
if individually rational, may undermine 
systemic market performance.
On the other hand, ensuring a diversity of 
players and restricting the scope of business 
in which they can engage may emerge, we 
believe, as one of the few ways of limiting 
the incentives of market participants to 
engage in highly correlated behaviour — a 
practice that would otherwise lead naturally 
to systemic risk.
Regulate to accumulate
The fact that derivatives may not only 
hamper the assessment of systemic risk, 
but also foster its emergence, has spurred 
a debate in recent years about the global 
financial architecture and its possible 
regulation. Four key reforms have been 
proposed, emphasizing the need for 
transparency and exchange markets, 
targeting the implicit subsidies that 
government-insured entities receive from 
the public and removing the priority given to 
derivative instruments in bankruptcy.
© 2013 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved
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Enforcing the use of exchange markets 
will make information on prices, volumes 
and exposures available to regulators and the 
public — rendering the network structure 
more transparent. It is also likely to limit the 
intrinsic problems associated with network 
interdependence, because the failure of 
an individual party would be absorbed by 
the exchange market, rather than being 
transmitted through the network. However, 
these markets, if undercapitalized, could also 
lead to a heightened systemic risk.
In general, well-designed regulatory 
systems must focus simultaneously 
on regulating the derivatives network, 
and mediating the influence of market 
participants on future policies. It is clear 
that banks profit from being regarded as too 
connected, too correlated — and even too 
complex — to fail, giving them an incentive 
to engage in excessive risk taking and 
amplifying the degree of systemic instability. 
A prudent strategy would therefore not 
only tame interdependencies and risk 
taking, but also restrict the power of the 
financial sector. Unfortunately, lobbying 
has played — and continues to play — an 
important role in limiting the development 
of regulatory structures designed to enhance 
systemic stability. In any case, reform must be 
approached dynamically, as market players — 
pursuing their individual incentives — find 
ever new ways to circumvent existing 
regulations at the expense of systemic 
stability and social welfare.
This certainly amounts to a formidable 
challenge, from the point of view of both 
network science and political economy 
theory, with significant societal implications. 
Clearly, the development of new network-
based metrics to assess systemic risk 
and evaluate the importance of financial 
institutions will be of enormous value — 
forging an already promising union 
between economists, network scientists 
and regulators. ❐
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Reconstructing a credit network
Guido Caldarelli, Alessandro Chessa, Andrea Gabrielli, Fabio Pammolli and Michelangelo Puliga
The science of complex networks can be usefully applied in finance, although there is limited data 
available with which to develop our understanding. All is not lost, however: ideas from statistical physics 
make it possible to reconstruct details of a financial network from partial sets of information.
Between financial systems or agents there may be reciprocal ties, of irregular number and weight, which create a 
highly connected structure with the features 
of a complex network1–4 — those ties may be 
in the form of liability, exposure, ownership 
or simple correlation.  Together these factors 
describe a topology for which the diffusion 
dynamics — of information, or of financial 
distress — among the institutions, or nodes, 
of the network is not straightforward, and 
can be quite unexpected.
Distress propagating in a financial network 
can cause bankruptcies and spread distrust, 
thereby changing the shape and the topology 
of connections. This in turn can give rise to a 
self-sustained process of failures, in an often-
unstoppable domino effect. In such a context, 
risk exposure is affected not only by the 
quality of an institution’s counterparts, but also 
by the quality of many other players, through 
complex chains of actions and reactions and 
with a corresponding increase of uncertainty, 
risk aversion and risk shifting, liquidity 
evaporation, collateral shortages and so on5.
Given that a network’s diffusion 
properties are deeply entwined with its 
topology, it is crucial to focus on the precise 
structure of the network. For example, 
even a few randomly placed shortcuts on a 
regular grid can create the so-called small-
world effect — a radical reduction of the 
distances between regions of the system that 
are otherwise far apart — which is one of 
the main reasons for the surprising velocity 
of distress propagation. It is therefore of 
fundamental importance to know how much 
the results of any analysis depend on exact 
knowledge of the network structure.
The network structure of financial 
systems is central to many of the processes 
and mechanisms that come into play during 
a crisis, and it has become a key motivation 
for some of the ‘macroprudential’ policies6 
developed during the current financial crisis, 
from bailouts to asset purchase programmes. 
Furthermore, when evaluating systemic risk 
for a specific financial institution, we must 
also consider the kind of ties it has, be they 
lending, exposure, correlation or ownership. 
Some ties result in more stable configurations 
than others, and this multilevel structure — 
which lacks an adequate mathematical 
representation at present— allows distress 
to propagate in environments that otherwise 
seem solid.
Missing links
Despite all that could be learned from an 
evaluation of systemic risk from topology, 
there is a major problem: lack of relevant 
information. Regulators, network scientists 
and economists are trying to get access 
to data on financial institutions that are 
confidential at present. At the same time, 
they are trying to find the best way to merge 
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